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Introduction
On November 3, 1995, David Morales was arrested outside a Los Angeles Police Station for being under the influence of and in possession of PCP. His wife had brought him to the police station asking for help. Morales was convicted and sentenced to twenty years to life in prison for the crime. This case was appealed all the way to the California Supreme
Court on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. During his summation, the prosecutor told the jury to consider, when deciding on the possession charge, that Morales was under the influence of PCP. Though the jury was informed that intoxication alone is not sufficient evidence to convict someone of possession, the prosecutor asked them how someone could become under the influence of a controlled substance without possessing it.
The seven justices of the California Supreme Court wrote three opinions in People vs.
Morales 1 . The controversy in the case was over whether the prosecutor had presented a case which was "legally incorrect" (7). The appellate defense attorney argued that the prosecutor had mislead the jury about the law governing PCP possession. In the majority opinion, Justice Mosk stated that while the prosecutor may have misstated the law, the court did present correct legal theory to the jury. According to Justice Mosk, it was the defense attorney's responsibility to point out this misconduct to the court. Since counsel made no objection, the claim was waived. Justice Mosk went on to interpret the prosecutor's summation not to be misleading. Justice Mosk noted, however, that the decision was a close call.
1 See People vs. Morales S059461.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Kennard wrote that by constantly suggesting that the defendant could not become intoxicated without being guilty of possession, the prosecutor clearly did commit prosecutorial misconduct. Justice Kennard agreed with the majority, however, that to overturn the conviction, the defense attorney would have had to make an objection during the trial. The dissenting opinion by Justice
Brown stated that the prosecutor used erroneous legal theory in his summation, and it is impossible for the reviewing court to determine whether the jury came to the guilty verdict on erroneous theory, and thus the decision must be reversed.
It is rare to see three opinions in a state supreme court. Nevertheless, while there is little disconsensus on state supreme courts, there is some disconsensus. Herein, I examine disconsensus on state supreme courts. During my study I found California to be among the states with the least amount of consensus on the state supreme court. I also found that California employed more law clerks than any other state in my study. It is my contention that California enjoyed so many disconsensuses because of the amount of law clerks employed by the Court. I hypothesize that justices engage in dissent based on the amount of resources available. When justices have more clerks they are able to write more opinions because there are more clerks to assist with opinion writing duties.
The Tradition of Dissent
This nation has a very strong tradition of dissent. In the judiciary, dissent has severed an important role, and led to significant ends. In the landmark 1896 U.S. Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537) the Court upheld "separate but equal" segregation as constitutional. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Harlan wrote a powerful dissent that would go down in history. In his dissent, Justice Harlan correctly projected that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case." He also wrote that the Louisiana statute which prohibited African
Americans from riding in the same railroad cars as whites was written to keep blacks out of white cars and not the other way around. Because of the underlying intent of the law, Harlan finds it to be in violation of the 14 th Amendment.
Justice Harlan's dissent provided the foundation for Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483) 58 years later. Knowing how disconsensus can affect the power of an opinion the Warren Court worked very hard to reach a strong consensus, so that the decision would be less likely to be reversed in the future.
In light of this, it seems relevant that there were two dissenting 2 opinions written in the Morales case in California. David Morales was sentenced to serve twenty years to life in prison. These two opinions could one day be a strong basis for a future appeal. Had Morales been convicted in a state with a stronger consensual tradition he likely would have a smaller chance at having his conviction overturned one day.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once said, "We are under the Constitution, but
the Constitution is what the judges say it is" (Peretti 1999, 3) . This is a profound statement.
Since it is up to judges to determine what the law means, they are in a unique position to change law as they see fit. They may change the law because they believe it is not in line with the original intent of the constitution, or possibly because it seems inconsistent with the direction of the country. Alternatively, justices may make decisions based on their own policy preferences. Herein, I intend to apply this theory to state supreme courts. While there have been studies on both the institutional setting of state supreme courts and studies on dissensus in these courts, no one has ever studied the effect of larger staffs on state supreme courts. As
Professor Best found a positive correlation between law clerks, support staff and a decline of consensual norms on the Supreme Court, I predict I will find a similar correlation between law clerks and consensual norms on state supreme courts. My goal is not only to look at the empirical and highly quantitative question of whether or not this effect exists in these courts, but also the normative question of whether consensual norms are good or bad. In the end I hope to be able to provide prescriptive theory pertaining to how a court should function at the institutional level.
Law Clerks and the United States Supreme Court
Best explored the Court as a small legislative body. The role of law clerks on the Court had become increasingly influential on opinion writing (Best 2002, 2-4) . This approach comes from Eugene Rostow, who advocates that scholars should look at judicial behavior as a set of multi-causal phenomena. Rather than the psychometric treatment of judicial decision making, scholars should use inclusive models and pay attention to the intuitional and structure features of the legal system (Rostow 1967, 57) .
Best explains the concept of "neo-institutionalism" as the discipline's reconsideration of institutional factors as shapers of individual behavior (2002, 11) . This has been applied to state courts by Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall. I discuss their work later, in my section on state courts. Prior to Best, however, neo-institutionalism had not been widely used by those who study the U.S. Supreme Court. Scholars did not entirely ignore the institutional setting in explaining dissensus on the Court. The trend has been to credit consensus or dissensus to the chief justice, turnover on the court, inexperienced justices, the caseload, substantive changes to the docket and ideological differences among the justices. Chief
Justice Hughes encouraged disagreement on his Court and his Court produced more dissents than previous Courts. Scholars have seen this as evidence that the chief justice is responsible for consensual norms on the Court (Best 2002, 14) .
According to Best, law clerks on the Supreme Court participate in such important roles as case selection and opinion writing. He points out that during the time prior to 1886, law clerks were not employed by the Supreme Court. The ever growing workload became too much for the justices to bear on their own and in 1886, Congress passed the Sundry Civil Act, which allowed each justice a stenographic clerk; it was not until the early twentieth century that law clerks would become part of each justice's chambers. Over time, the institutional role of these clerks has changed. They have gone from simply helping justices prepare for oral argument and doing research to their current role of helping select cases to be heard and drafting opinions (Best 2002, 35-36 (Riker 1990, 172) .
Since rational choice analysis assumes actors are experts, it assumes that actors will, indeed, make value maximizing decisions. This has been criticized in many fields, such as international relations, because actors do not have perfect knowledge, and often make decisions which do not produce the best outcome.
When studying judicial decisions, the model seems to fit the requirements of rational choice much better. The events of the Court are defined so clearly that the cases are actually called 'cases'. The players are certainly experts. The actors are considered dispassionate (though if you buy into the attitudinal model they may not be so dispassionate.) The game has clear rules. Looking at the Court through the rational choice model, we can easily plug in the addition of law clerks and see how that would affect which decision is value maximizing. As Best writes, the addition of law clerks to the Supreme Court decreased interaction between the individual justices. I explore how rational choice analysis can enhance our understanding of Best's law clerk theory.
Segal and Spaeth divide rational choice analysis in the Supreme Court into two camps. The internal camp focuses on interaction between justices. The external camp focuses on constraints imposed on the court by external political actors (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 100) . For the purposes of this research, I am more interested in the internal camp. The reason for this is that when looking at the law clerk effect on consensual norms, it is more important to explore internal behavior. Admittedly, though, since external pressure may affect voting behavior, it may also affect consensual norms to an extent.
Walter Murphy is perhaps the most important scholar in the internal camp. In
Elements of Judicial Strategy, Murphy explains the strategies a justice must take on in order to achieve his or her policy goals. Murphy says that a Supreme Court justice must behave like any leader in politics. When furthering a policy goal, the justice must strategically act to gain the endorsements of his or her peers, but also take steps to ensure that subordinates (lower courts) will accept and apply the policy decision. A strategic minded justice should use the same strategy when influencing lower courts as when persuading his or her associates (Murphy 1964, 91-92) . In this, Murphy looks at the entire judicial structure as a bureaucracy. This is relevant to my research because Murphy views the Court in light of the group behavior, which is essentially what I am doing.
Murphy also explores the ethics of judicial strategy. It seems almost like a loaded question to ask if strategic interaction is ethical, since we are trained to think that the judiciary is, and should be, completely independent of politics. Murphy believes this stemmed from the fact that justices have to be the impartial voice of the law while at the same time writing opinions which are supposed to provide justice to the people. The obvious question is whether a justice is acting ethically when pursuing specific policy interests.
Murphy points out that justices are inevitably policy makers, since they must ultimately either uphold or strike down legislation (Murphy 1964, 176-178) .
Another important text injudicial strategic interaction is The Choices Justices Make
by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. In Choices, Epstein and Knight attempts to lend more systematic evidence to Murphy's theories. Their strategic account of judicial decision making comprises three main ideas: "justices' actions are directed toward the attainment of goals; justices are strategic; and institutions structure justices' interaction" (Epstein and Knight 1998, 10-11) . The first idea is not much of a departure from the attitudinal model. It also follows very closely to rational choice theory. When making a decision, a political actor will choose the option believed to best promote his or her own policy preferences. This assumes that the actor can rank alternatives in terms of predictable outcomes. Epstein and Knight point to examples of Supreme Court justices voting against certain policy preferences which they hold in order to better further policy goals which they value more. In this sense justices are behaving strategically. The third assumption is very important. Epstein and Knight claim that the institutional setting of the Supreme Court determines the interaction between justices. When justices write opinions, they have to write them so that other justices will sign on to them and when they hand down decision, they have to be written so that other institutions will see them as binding (Epstein and Knight 1998, 10-13) .
These rational choice and strategic interaction studies have primarily been used on the The strategic interaction model fits in very well with the Best's law clerk theory. If justices behave strategically, it would seem more likely that the addition or subtraction of law clerks would affect dissent. In other words, a non-strategic justice, who is a blind arbiter of the law, would not make strategic calculations about prioritizing their resources. A strategic justice will assign clerks to work on cases which he or she believes they will be most effective. If state supreme court justices behave the same way as U.S. Supreme Court justices, the model should also work in the state courts. All judges and justices make choices when deciding cases. Ultimately, their job is to make decisions that affect policy. Whether the justice is a blind arbiter of the law or a strategic actor, he or she must make a decision.
State Supreme Courts
There has been some scholarly work on state supreme court behavior and structure, but not nearly as much as the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, most of the models I use are adapted from work on the U.S. Supreme Court. There exists, however, some very relevant and interesting studies on states supreme courts. Above, I mentioned Brace and Hull's work.
In "Integrated Models of Dissent," they look at integrated models of judicial dissent at the individual level. They approach this from a neo-institutional perspective, taking into account the attitudinal, jurisprudential, and contextual approaches (Brace and Hull 1993, 916-917) .
They find that justices choose to dissent, not merely on attitudinal differences, case facts or contextual forces, but also on all of these interacting with the institutional setting (Brace and Hull 1993, 930 Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court also decided this case along ideological lines.
The more conservative member's of the court broke the conservative tradition to support the President's equal protection rights. The liberal block, on the other hand, voted against equal protection, in favor of a candidate who is more in line with their ideological views.
Generally, when it comes to equal protection cases, the court is divided the other way around. (Romans 1974, 38-40) .
All of this literature has helped to explain the institutional setting of state supreme courts and why state judges vote the way they do. State supreme courts have many roles to play, both as intermediaries between lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, and as courts themselves. While they seem to vote strategically at times, these courts are clearly more institutionally limited than their federal counterpart. Still, the evidence implies that there is some strategic voting going on in state supreme courts. Since justices do behave strategically, it is likely that if the presence of law clerks affects dissent on the U.S. Supreme
Court, it will similarly affect dissent on state supreme courts. systematically surveyed every appellate court in the United States, both state and federal. In the study, they document the basic work areas of the staff and the tasks performed by each group. These groups were identified as law clerks, central staff attorneys and clerks of court (Hanson, et al. 2000, 1-2) .
State Supreme Court Staff
The National Center set out with four objectives: to determine if generalizable work areas could be determined; to develop a comparative view of the relative amount of time each group spends on a broad range of tasks; to gauge the similarities and differences between the nature of the work of each type of legal staff; and to see how the pattern of time commitments made by each type of legal staff holds under different conditions, such as different courts and different size caseloads (Hanson et al. 2000, 3-4) .
Hanson, et al., conclude that the work of appellate court legal staff can be divided in to nine work areas: assisting justices in opinion preparation, handling cases at procedural events, training staff and court management, prehearing assistance, researching substantive motions and applications for writs, attending decisional conferences, conducting settlement conferences, and preparing memoranda on discretionary petitions. These work areas are generally the domain of one type of legal staff. Law Clerks tend to assist justices in preparing opinions. Clerks of court are generally involved in court management, but law clerks often play a small role there too. Staff attorneys play much more diverse roles than other staff (Hanson, et. al. 2000, 5) .
The study further distinguishes between short term law clerks and career law clerks.
Initially, law clerks were appointed exclusively to short term appointments so that they would not create undue influences over justices. This gave way to the appointment of long term clerks when some justices prefers career law clerks with more experience and knowledge of the justices' personal style. Career clerks required less training and supervision (Hanson et al. 2000, 8-9 ).
Hanson et al. point out that there is contention among professionals and scholars concerning the desired role of a law clerk. Some considered a law clerk's input a crucial and advantageous component of a justice's decision. According to this camp, clerks provide an alternative view for the justice. They also advocate alternatives against a judge's natural resistance. Another view is that the purpose of a law clerk is not to enhance the capacity for change on the court, but rather to work in a limited role for a limited length of time compared to a justice. While one view allows for law clerks to have a great deal of influence over the court, the other prefers that clerks provide only independent support to a justice. However, whatever task a law clerk is performing, the very nature of the clerk's position will require the clerk to make some sort of judgment which would be likely to affect the outcome of a case. According to Hanson et al., the question of differences in the roles of short-term and career clerks is still unknown. They suggested, however, that it can be inferred that career clerks have more influence on courts (Hanson et al. 2000, 8-10) .
Assisting justices in writing opinions, according to the survey responses of The National Center's study, was the most similar duty across courts. That is to say, the process of this task was more similar across courts than the process of other tasks. It also found that across courts, law clerks (both career and short-term) dedicate more of their time to this task than any other type of staff. Generally a clerk would review the record, draft an opinion (usually the facts of the case), consult a justice on an individual case, check footnotes and proof mandates (Hanson, et al. 2000, 39) .
Since my study is an exploration of dissent, understanding the duty of assisting justices in writing opinions is paramount. If clerks spend a disproportionate amount of time assisting justices in writing opinions, it would support my theory that the addition of more law clerk to a court causes justices to write more opinions.
Summary
In formulating his theory, Professor Best brings the concept of neo-institutionalism, In order to test my theory that limited resources affect dissenting opinion writing I tested two general hypotheses. The first is that courts with more law clerks have more dissent. The second is that courts with larger caseloads have less dissent. 4 It is likely that there are other factors that would help to explain nonconsensual opinion writing. I looked at six other independent variables: number of justices, number of support staff, state population, political polarity and individual state (for which I used dummy variables). These variables did not fit into the model and all either reduced my R 2 or made it more difficult to see the relationship between the variables I used. Of all of them I was mostly surprised to see that political polarity seemed to be irrelevant. It seemed that the level of political controversy in a state would most likely affect my study. I was also surprised that the state dummy variables were insignificant. The only dummy variables which approached significance were California and New Jersey. This is interesting, however, because California and New Jersey were the only states to have more than one case with 3 opinions as well as the only states to have more than two clerks per justices. For the 2001 session of each of the ten courts, I coded every ten cases published by the courts. In all, I coded 148 cases. Similarly, Massachusetts has the largest caseload in my sample. While
Sample Selection and Data Collection
Data Analysis
Massachusetts was troubling within my model when looking at law clerks, when looking at caseload it fits very well. It would seem that despite having two clerks per justice, the caseload in Massachusetts is so large that it prevents justices from writing dissenting opinions. This would make perfect sense, except that halfway across the country, with only one short term-clerk per justice and publishing opinions for 7 less cases than Massachusetts, the Iowa Supreme Court published 3 dissenting opinions in twenty cases. While both Iowa and Massachusetts show support for the caseload theory, it seems strange that Iowa would produce more opinions than Massachusetts, since Massachusetts has double the law clerks and a similar caseload.
Maine, as well, is less puzzling when it comes to the relationship between its caseload and opinion writing. Maine had the fifth largest caseload in my sample in 2001. While, it does not have the largest caseload, it did hear more cases than most states with large numbers of disconsensus. While is still unclear why Maine enjoys the amount of consensus it does, it is not unusual that the Court should enjoy a certain tradition of consensual norms.
Concerning the caseload theory, Missouri seems to be the most puzzling. Missouri had the smallest caseload in the sample, and did enjoy a reasonable amount of disconsensus publishing 12 opinions in 9 cases. While this suggests there is some tradition of dissent on the Missouri Supreme Court, it does not compare to the disconsensus in California and New
Jersey. This is most easily explained by my data analysis which exemplifies that the relationship between clerks and opinions is stronger than the relationship between opinions and caseload. Despite Missouri's small caseload, the fact that the court has less than three clerks per case prevent it from writing as many non consensual opinions as New Jersey and California. If true, this helps to explain the curve in figure 2.
Another difference which my model does not account for is the differences in these individual cases. Each of these courts hear a different amount of cases in their original jurisdiction. They also hear cases on appeal from different lower tiered courts. The amount of appeals a case must go through to get to the state supreme court would affect the average amount of controversy of cases reaching the court. This could also affect consensual opinion
writing. ... [T] he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them... It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments (Hamilton 1788) .
Summary
Since 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court has been practicing judicial review. Many argue that by striking down federal laws, the Court has usurped legislative power. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that interpretation, to take away a justice's resources to write dissenting opinions so that courts may reach more consensual opinions would undoubtedly create more powerful majority opinions. If someone were concerned about courts "legislating from the bench" it would be wise to allow courts to employ more law clerks in order to weaken these opinions.
The judiciary behaves more like the judiciary which Hamilton writes about when dissenting opinions are present. The majority of the court is forced to defend their position by engaging the dissent. If one were concerned that the addition of clerks would gives justices more resources to craft the law to their own policy preferences, they should understand that by allowing for more disconsensus on courts, justices are made less capable of affecting radical change in the nation.
The importance of minority opinions is also expressed by John Stuart Mill in his classic work On Liberty. Mill writes that in a democratic government in which the majority rules, the majority may wish to oppress a minority. Based on this fear of tyranny of the majority, Mill says that there is a need to limit the amount to which public opinion can interfere with individual liberty. To protect from this tyranny, Mill believes there should be a liberty of thought and discussion. He asserts that minorities should be able to openly disagree with majorities (Mill 1859, 931-938 Sunstein argues that judges are also vulnerable to the influences of their colleagues.
Sunstein finds that in a three justice panel a good predictor of how a justice will vote is the party of the President who appointed him. Interestingly, an even better predictor of how a judge will vote is the party of the President who appointed the other two judges on the bench.
A Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees is more likely to vote along stereotypical lines than a Republican appointee sitting with one other Republican appointee and one Democratic appointee (Sunstein 2003, 166-167 Since I find that courts with more law clerks produce more dissenting opinions, law clerks play a very important role in the way a justice must behave in order to pursue those preferences. A justice writing a majority opinion in a court with a small staff has fewer obstacles, as his colleagues are less likely to produce dissenting opinions; therefore, his opinion will meet little opposition and be likely to be followed by lower courts. A dissenting justice on the same court, however, faces a larger obstacle. The justice has little resources to produce an opinion as his staff is bogged down with other duties. Furthermore, his colleagues are less likely to dissent, so the dissenting opinion faces large obstacles.
On a court with a large staff, a justice writing for the majority will face more obstacles. In order to get other justices to sign on to his opinion, he must craft it carefully, if his colleagues disagree with a small part of the opinion; they are more likely to produce a dissenting opinion. Similarly, a justice who wishes to write a dissent has more resources available to produce an opinion if he disagrees with the majority of the court. Caseload will also affect a justice's strategical motivations in the same way. A justice writing for the court will have to factor in the caseload, when considering how much he will have to conform his opinion to the center of the court in order to keep members from filing dissenting opinions.
Concerning the ethical question I raise about the presences of dissenting opinions, I
conclude that nonconsensual opinion writing is crucial to a healthy judiciary. While there is concern that disconsensus weakens opinions, we have seen that justices are aware of this and in many important decisions, such as Brown they work hard to reach consensus, knowing that dissenting opinions will have an adverse affect on their policy goal.
Further Research Questions
A good study would be to explore the institutional roles of state supreme courts on an individual level and see how this affects consensual norms. I would predict that courts which hear more cases in their original jurisdiction will be skewed towards showing strong tradition of consensual norms, when that may not be the case in their appellate jurisdiction. Their institutional role should also help determine the relevance of the size of their caseload.
Another study that would be worth while would be to do an intensive study of the California Supreme Court across several years dating back to before the court employed so many clerks. If my model holds true, consensus will increase as the number of law clerks decrease. This study should also look deeply at more cases and try and isolate any policy preferences of individual justices on the court. In my study I was unable to find any solid voting blocks any court, so this may be difficult, however if someone were to conduct that study it would prove very interesting.
In further studies, it would also be usefully to test other variables which might explain the variation in dissenting opinion writing. This research would be greatly amplified if one could control for factors such as polarity and state population.
A study of cases appealed from state supreme courts to the United State Supreme
Court could also prove interesting. One should find that cases with dissenting opinions were more likely to see further appeals. If this is not true, it might under mind some of the weight I and previous scholars have given to the importance of dissent.
In Conclusion
David Morales was sentenced to twenty years in prison based, partially, on a summation which two of the seven member of the California Supreme Court considered to be a blatant act of prosecutorial misconduct. The remaining five justices at least signed on to an opinion which stated that while they did not believe the prosecutor committed misconduct, the question was a close call. If David Morales' misfortune is a result of injustice, these dissenting opinions might help to set that injustice right.
The actions of the judiciary affect real people. At the end of a long process, in all of these states, seven people in funny clothes decide what the law means. While we often try and assume they are working from a sort of divinely inspired objectivity, it is not consistent with what has been written about the judiciary. Judges and justices are fallible human beings with opinions, ideologies and policy preferences. I do not mean to fault justices for having such preferences, nor am I suggesting they should not be allowed to pursue policy preferences, when justices ultimately must, through either activism or restraint, often play the role of a policy maker. Rather, I contend that if they must be policy makers, than they should be equipped with the best resources available to serve that roll.
If law clerks allow justices to craft more dissenting opinions, I therefore conclude that courts are better served with more law clerks. There could be a dissent which would forever change the face of legal theory, which is never written simply because the justice either did not have time, or was trying to conform to the opinions of his or her colleagues.
While my model also shows that small case loads allow for more dissent, I am timid to advocate for courts to hear fewer cases. If the ultimate goal is so that more opinions are heard, it does not logically follow that justices should hear fewer cases. While there is a danger of courts becoming too bogged down with fewer important cases, there is an even greater danger of important opinions not being written by justices, because the justice never heard the case.
I attempted to create an empirical model to approach a normative question. While normative questions require an analytical response and one could come to a conclusion without looking at empirical data, my model does a great deal to show how this dilemma plays out practically. By approaching this question in this manner, I was able to provide a prescriptive conclusion. If one believes dissent is good for democracy, then it would be best to allow courts to have more law clerks.
